In the following contribution I propose an analytical approach in which dealing with differences in decision-making is the central factor in explaining the output of European governance. It is the hypothesis that differences can, under certain conditions, be a positive potential for effective governance and problem-solving in the European Union. The prerequisite conditions include actors that take differences seriously, structures of decision-making that are suitable for recognising and organising differences and processes of decision-making in which actors deal with differences in a democratic and communicative way. The analytical approach is applied to European constitution making and the European Convention. First, it is analysed how representative the membership of the Convention has been. It can be assumed that Members of the Convention in order to recognise differences and have an interest in the positive potential of difference must represent differences themselves. Second, it is examined how difference in institutional concepts with regard to a greater involvement of national parliaments in European politics was dealt with. Did arguing influence the protocol on national parliaments in the Convention's draft or have status and power been more important for the solution that was finally agreed upon? Third, it is investigated how difference in interests between big and small states with regard to the position of the President of the European Council influenced the final decision. Although difference was dealt with less democratically and communicatively than in the case of national parliaments the arguments of Members of the Convention against a permanent President were not without consequences for the final article in the Convention's draft. Having shown in the empirical part that differences can be a positive potential for European constitution making, I conclude with the normative proposition that the democratic organisation of difference is the task of a European Constitutional Treaty.
I. Introduction
In its issue of that day, the paper published the text of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe which the President of the Convention, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, was to present to the European Council meeting in Thessaloniki on 20 th June 2003. One factor looms large in both the media and integration policy: the balance between institutions. Plenary debates of the European Convention repeatedly stressed how important it was to achieve a balance between European institutions. While balance and resemblance are seen as positive, imbalance and difference are considered problems of European integration. Only 'diversity in unity' is accepted.
Balance also plays an eminent role in theories of integration. Intergovernmentalism regards the bargaining power of influential governments, the economic advantages the European Union offers member states, and the willingness of governments to meet their obligations to be the three persistent explanatory factors for European integration. 3 Functionalists and neo-functionalists also perceive integration as a linear development. The functionalist approach, well suited to describing and explaining policies connected with the Common Market, is less appropriate in dealing with new areas of European policy, for example in the social and environmental fields. 4 Not only has 'collective organisation across borders proved more difficult and uneven from sector to sector' than anticipated, but functionalists have underestimated the influence of heads of state and government and the sometimes anti-integration impact of politicisation in the European Union. 5 The predominance of linear processes and the importance of balance are central assumptions in theories and real politics of European integration. Yet, empirical research shows that European integration has to do with non-linear processes and states of imbalance. 6 In such non-linear processes and states of imbalance differences play a vital role. This is why I propose an approach 7 to analysing the evolution of European integration in which difference is in the centre. Difference with a potential 1 This is an amended version of a paper delivered to the European Forum of the European University Institute in Florence on 18 th March 2004. Thanks to all who participated and offered comments and criticism, especially to the commentators Maarten Vink and Leonard Besselink and to the anonymous reviewers. Thanks also to Joachim Nettelbeck from the Wissenschaftskolleg Berlin who incited me to study the chances of difference for European integration. He drew my attention to the interesting book by A. L. Becker, 1995. Beyond Translation, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press) showing that translating a text from one language into another or learning a foreign language should not only be seen as problems of finding out the equivalence in meaning but as chances to experience a different culture. 'Languages differ in the silences they practice, in the way they make your face look, in the images of context they shape […] Learning Burmese is learning Burmese ways to reshape Burmese memories into new Burmese contexts […] Burmese is a web of words and silences that shapes a context, in space, in time, in social relations, in nature, and in emotions and subtle intimations'. Ibid., 12. to influence the degree of effective governance and problem-solving in the European Union is the decisive category in my analytical approach. 8 The potential can be positive or negative.
So far, scientists have stressed the negative potential of difference in their research on European integration.
9 Now, the perspective should be widened with a focus on the positive potential of difference. 10 From such a perspective the process of European constitution making will be analysed in the following paper. It is the hypothesis of this paper that, under certain conditions, differences can offer positive potential for establishing a constitutional treaty that provides a basis for effective governance and problem-solving in the European Union. An important condition is that differences are dealt with in a democratic and communicative way in the process of constitution making. I start with a brief outline of the theoretical assumptions that are related to my analytical approach. I go on to test these assumptions against the empirical findings concerning the role of differences in the European Convention. Finally I show that the empirical findings have normative consequences for a European constitution.
II. Theoretical Assumptions: Difference as a Potential for the Evolution of European Governance
European integration can be understood as a process of co-evolution. The process started with problems of societies that could no longer be solved by the nation state alone. Political elites in six nation states therefore started developing supranational problem-solving approaches and institutions. Transnational activities by national and European elites, burgeoning European law, institutions, slowly emerging European public spheres became elements of a dynamic political system. Equilibrium is rare in such a dynamic system.
11 Metastable balance and imbalance are more common. The sequence of balance, metastable balance and imbalance produces non-linear development. Differences are especially numerous and important in states of imbalance. Such states, in which the arrangement of elements and the characteristics of the system change over time, have been frequent in the process of European integration. They allow the system to develop new structures, 12 which influence the direction of further development. This is exactly what happens in the European Union.
Political elites, institutions, treaties, policies, and public spheres co-evolve. The elements of the system are independent and interdependent. Europeanisation is more rapid in some policy areas than others and impetus given in one part of the system can, though not necessarily, prompt change elsewhere. Development is non-linear, shifting direction over time. Europeanisation proceeds at different speeds in different policy areas. Governance in the European Union has to do with the 'ups, downs and plateaus of the integration process'. 13 Moreover, implementation of European policies furthers differentiation because 3 changes in national policy engendered by European decisions depend on the different political systems with their specific form of interest mediation, administration and problem-solving philosophies.
14 Important for co-evolution is a basic structure common to all elements of the governance system in the European Union. Such a structure is difference. 15 Difference is derived from the Latin term 'differre' and can be defined as the state of being distinct in a neutral sense. It is assumed in this understanding that it is important to recognise differences in their own right. Differences per se do not imply differences in values. With regard to different cultures this would mean that 'we all recognize the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their worth'.
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A typology of differences in the European Union still has to be developed. Such a typology should be based on the results of empirical research and should be constantly reconsidered with regard to empirical research. In my research on European constitution making I am interested in finding out in which way difference is mobilised and organised at the political and the constitutional level. By concentrating on the role of difference in constitution making one should not understate what a community must find in common to be a community. Therefore my perspective with its focus on difference can only be seen as a little stone 'in an always incomplete mosaic' 17 of integration theories. I distinguish between types of structural difference and concrete differences. There is structural difference in ideas (ideologies), identities, interests, institutions, problems, knowledge, status, power and structural difference in space and time.
18 These structural differences induce concrete differences in a multitude of fields. Among these fields are history, religion, language, culture, public sphere, civil society, politics, administration, interest mediation, social stratification and the economy.
Differences can be a driving force for successful governance and problem-solving in the European Union. Such differences can be said to have a positive potential. But this is not the case with all differences. Whether their potential is positive or negative depends on their type, where they occur, on their magnitude, and on the specific circumstances in which they occur.
In order to develop a positive potential for European governance, differences do not have to disappear or lead to consensus. Neil Walker's 'Idea of Constitutional Pluralism' is a convincing theoretical approach to difference in the constitutional field. He distinguishes three dimensions: an explanatory claim, assuming that European integration can be explained only within a framework that assumes multiple sites of constitutional discourse and authority; a normative claim, welcoming the implications of constitutional pluralism, 'contending that the only acceptable ethic of political responsibility for the new Europe is one that is premised upon mutual recognition and respect between national and supranational authorities;' and, finally, an epistemic claim, stating that 'the very representation of distinct constitutional sites-EU and member states-as distinct constitutional sites implies an incommensurability of the knowledge and authority (sovereignty) claims emanating from these sites'. In spite of European integration, co-operation, mutual recognition, and the growing relational dimension of constitutional units 'the constitutional profile associated with each site [ Differences between constitutional sites will thus continue to exist and there can be no objection as long as each constitutional unit 'encourages openness' for communication with other constitutional units. 20 Similarly, my point of departure is the idea that the way of dealing with structural difference and concrete differences is important for European integration. As long as differences are dealt with democratically and communicatively, and as long as they are not so great as to be detrimental to a European model of society, 21 they can exist without prejudicing European integration. On the contrary: it is the hypothesis of my paper that, under certain conditions, differences can be a positive potential for legitimate and effective decisions in European governance. 22 The prerequisite conditions include the following.
First: political actors must take an interest in recognising differences and in using the potential of differences for effective governance and problem-solving. It should not be forgotten that some political actors pursue strategies of domination and exploitation and have no interest at all in solving problems. 23 A second condition is that the structures of decision-making and of implementing political decisions are suitable for recognising and organising differences. Third: differences can have a positive potential only if political actors deal with them in a democratic way. A 'democratic' way of dealing with differences can be defined as a decision-making and implementation process that generates collectively-binding decisions of the free volition of the people and with reference to the will of the people. 24 On the basis of political freedom and political equality being the central values of a democracy, the right of the individual to participate in public affairs becomes crucial. 25 For effective participation it is important that citizens have adequate information for developing an 'enlightened understanding' of the political issues that have to be decided.
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Fourth: the positive potential of differences can be realised only if political actors deal with differences in a communicative way. Dealing 'communicatively' with differences is defined as a decision-making process involving an intensive exchange of arguments and concepts that affects the final decision. This exchange must take place within the political elite and between the political elite and citizens if decisions that are not only collectively binding but also legitimate are to be reached. 28 As long as arguing and bargaining in dealing with differences influence political decisions and their implementation more than status, power and money we can conclude that differences are dealt with communicatively. 29 And finally processes of decision-making and implementation must be such that they further the trust of political actors and of citizens in a fair way of dealing with differences. Only on the basis of such a trust in fair play will it be possible for actors to accept differences ( Figure I ). 6) Processes of implementation, in which the trust of actors that differences are dealt in a fair way is advanced/not advanced.
In the first step of this analytical approach the governing-and problem-solving capacity of political decisions in the European Union is the dependent variable for which explanations are wanted. It is assumed that the degree of the governing-and problem-solving capacity of political decisions in the European Union depends on actors who recognise differences and are interested in their positive potential, on structures that are suited for recognising and organising differences and on decisionmaking processes in which actors deal with differences democratically and communicatively.
In the second step of the analysis the degree of the governing-and problem-solving capacity of political decisions becomes one of the independent variables for explaining the effectiveness of European governance and problem-solving. Analogous to the first step it is now analysed to what degree actors in implementing decisions recognise differences and deal with them in a democratic and communicative way and to what degree structures and processes of implementation are suitable for such a way of dealing with differences.
Thus, in the proposed analytical model the ways of dealing with differences in decision-making and in implementing decisions are the central factors in explaining the effectiveness of European
The degree of effective governance and problem-solving in the European Union 7 governance and problem-solving. 30 It is my hypothesis that a democratic and communicative way of dealing with differences is better suited for a high degree of effective governance and problem-solving in the European Union than a non-democratic and non-communicative way. It could be said that the politics of difference 31 determine European policy.
It is not assumed that taking differences seriously and dealing with them democratically and communicatively will produce consensus or change preferences. But the deliberative model of democracy argues convincingly that a discursive structure in decision-making gains legitimising power from the assumption that decisions reached in such discourse can be expected to be reasonable. The discursive level of a public debate preparing a decision is thus the decisive variable. 32 It might well be that argument about different ideas and bargaining between different interests produces a compromise that does not settle the conflict. Such a compromise will then be the basis for a new round of politics and probably a new decision in the future. But according to my theoretical premises effective decisions are best prepared within democratic and communicative processes that are open to differences and in which differences are not played down. Decisions that emerge from a democratic and communicative dealing with differences seem best suited to solve complex, and especially transnational problems. That a failure to pay adequate attention to differences produces deficient policy is well illustrated by the EU's ineffective reaction to the BSE-crisis.
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III. Empirical Findings: The Role of Difference in European Constitution Making
My analytical approach 'Difference and European Governance' will now be applied to European constitution making. Therefore, I translate the general variables to variables that are relevant for explaining the role of difference in the European Convention.
It can be assumed that Members of the Convention in order to recognise differences and have an interest in the positive potential of differences must first of all represent differences themselves. In this regard, the interesting question is how representative Convention membership was.
The second condition for exploitation of the positive potential of difference in the Convention are structures that are suitable for recognising and organising differences. Were the standing orders of the Convention favourable for an inclusive approach towards differences? How did the working groups proceed with regard to differences? What about the strategy of the Convention Praesidium to debate conflictual institutional issues only at the end of deliberations? 'We knew that the biggest difference of opinions were on the institutions […] So we intentionally put the institutions at the end of the agenda, expecting that meanwhile the Convention in its thinking would be far enough to say that we now cannot fail the institutions-and that's exactly what happened' (interview with a Member of the 30 The term 'governance' is not used in the narrow sense of steering capacity and governability of sectors, but includes policy-development and implementation in public-private networks and self-regulating societal systems. What was the Convention's understanding of its work? Postnational constitution making can be seen 'as a vector rather than a point' 34 and means 'a dialogical and procedural conceptualisation of constitutionalism in the EU'. 35 Such a concept problematises 'linear assumptions about progress from a union of states to an integrated polity, and posits a reflexive critique of institutions, legal forms and identity formations beyond statist limits, in which the nation state is one actor, but not a privileged one'. 36 Did the Convention see it that way?
The other variables (Figure II no. 3 to 5) that can explain the final output of the Convention's work concern the way in which Members of the Convention dealt with differences. According to my approach one will have to test if decision-making in the Convention has been democratic, communicative and fair with regard to differences.
Democratic participation by citizens is realised primarily through free, equal and periodic parliamentary elections on the basis of universal suffrage. 37 The influence of the European Parliament and national parliaments is accordingly an important criterion for democratic constitution making in the Convention. Not only participation through representation but also the degree of democratic participation inside 38 the Convention has to be analysed. Did accession state members participate on an equal basis? Did the Praesidium take the arguments of the plenary seriously? Was 'consensus' defined by the Praesidium or did it have a real basis in the interests of the 'conventionnels'? Which groups and interests were excluded?
With regard to the communicative way of dealing with differences in the Convention, it is useful, for example, to examine whether the argumentation of Members of the Convention interrelates and whether convincing arguments in debate result in draft articles being amended or at least reviewed ( Figure II) . Did arguing influence the Convention's draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe or have status and power been more important for the result of the Convention's work? From the beginning it was clear that the Convention's power was limited and the final decisions would be taken at the Intergovernmental Conference. Whatever opportunity the Convention offered for arguing, it was deliberation 'under the shadow of the veto'. 39 ( Figure II) . 2) Structures of the Convention that are suitable/not suitable for recognising and organising differences;
3) Processes of decision-making, in which Members of the Convention deal with differences democratically/non-democratically; 4) Processes of decision-making, in which Members of the Convention deal with differences communicatively/non-communicatively; 5) Processes of decision-making, in which the trust of Members of the Convention that differences are dealt with in a fair way is advanced /not advanced.
I now focus on three variables of the Convention's decision-making process explaining the result of the Convention's work: the representativeness of Convention membership, dealing with differences democratically/non-democratically and dealing with differences communicatively/non-communicatively. From the above mentioned types of difference I have chosen difference in institutional concepts and difference in interests.
A. Representativeness of Convention Membership
The Convention has not been a democratically elected constitutional assembly. At Laeken in 2001, member state heads of state and government decided to delegate the task of preparing one or more proposals for achieving greater democracy and efficiency in an enlarged Union to a convention. The Convention started life as a 'preparatory body'. 40 At the Nice Summit, the Belgian delegation claimed that more effective procedures for institutional reform had to be found. The Belgian move was initially 40 41 The other member states agreed to the Laeken Declaration because they were convinced that intergovernmental bargaining would be the crucial factor of constitution making regardless of the Convention. 42 The 'top-down' setting-up of the Convention is also demonstrated by pre-nomination of the Praesidium.
Nevertheless, membership of the Convention was far more representative than the membership of intergovernmental conferences. It should not be forgotten that it was considered progress when, for the first time in the history of European integration, two members of the European Parliament, Elmar Brok and Elisabeth Guigou, were able to attend meetings of the representatives of governments once a month (!) during the 1996/1997 Intergovernmental Conference that led to the Treaty of Amsterdam. It is a long way from this step to the innovation of the European Convention. In the dynamic system of the European Union it was accomplished within four years.
The
It was an innovation to include accession countries in the decision-making process, although they did not participate on a fully equal footing. The Slovenian parliamentarian Alojz Peterle became a 'guest' in the Praesidium, and accession country 'conventionnels' were unable to block a consensus reached by member state 'conventionnels'. 43 Only 17 of the 105 Convention memberssome 16%-were women. The multicultural character of many member and accession states was not taken into account, either. 'Here the deficit is even more severe than in relation to the paucity of women, since it amounts to an almost complete silence'. Members of national parliaments, constituting the biggest group in the Convention (56 of 105 members), are said to have been the 'least cohesive' group. They lacked a common culture and the capability to act as a single body. 45 In my view, more research is needed to evaluate the influence of national parliaments in the Convention. Differences in parliamentary experience may well prove to have been an advantage in the quest for solutions in the Convention. One such solution that suggests difference was a potential is the protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union. The decision-making process in the Convention that produced this solution is a good example for a democratic and communicative handling of difference in institutional concepts.
B. Difference in Institutional Concepts in the Convention
Greater involvement of national parliaments in European politics and greater democracy in the EU are related issues. National parliaments are considered to be closer than European institutions to the citizens. Greater involvement of national parliaments in European politics could therefore strengthen European democracy. The Convention discussed the role of national parliaments communicatively. There was farreaching discussion of different institutional concepts for the participation of national parliaments. One issue was whether a new institution for national parliaments at the European level was needed.
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The first debate in the plenary session on 7 th June 2002 showed that a vast majority of Convention members was in favour of national parliaments playing a greater role. The secretariat had prepared a paper describing the role of national parliaments in the architecture of the European Union (CONV 67/02). The plenary debate addressed four questions, including whether it was useful for member states to compare practices of parliamentary control over government and to establish 'best practices'. Procedures in Finland and Sweden were debated. Some members of the Convention proposed that representatives of national parliaments join the government delegation of their country to the Council. There were also proposals to strengthen the effectiveness of COSAC (Conférence des organes specialisés dans les affaires communautaires et européennes des parlements de l'Union européenne). On the whole, a wide range of possibilities was thus discussed (CONV 97/02). In the plenary debate on 7 th June 2002 from 9.30 until 12.50, Convention members used a 'blue card' for immediate intervention five times, and, in a total of 70 contributions, the interventions of fellow members were referred to 30 times. 49 And later on in the debate, MEP Alexander Earl of Stockton used his blue card to criticize members of the Convention for exceeding their allotted time in the debate. He explicitly mentioned his 'good friend Barnier' who was able 'to turn three minutes into five'. Stockton proposed: 'You should, in future, and I would like to formally suggest that when the time limit is reached the microphone is cut off at that moment, without fear of favour.'-'That's a good suggestion', Giuliano Amato answered. 50 Not many members of the Convention were in favour of a new institution for national parliaments at the European level. However, the few advocates of such an institution insisted that the proposal should not be removed from the agenda without deliberation. Portuguese MP Maria Eduarda Azevedo said: 'A new chamber for national parliaments is worth a debate without prejudices'. 51 Similarly, Baroness Scotland of Asthal from the British House of Lords argued: 'We all agree that we must think creatively to develop a new environment within which national parliaments will be able to contribute effectively to the European debate […] The UK has contributed some ideas to the debate. My Prime Minister's proposal for a body of national parliamentarians to police subsidiarity, for example. Others have put forward interesting ideas. In particular, I would like to commend Mr. Bruton's thoughtful contribution to this Convention and that of the Swedish and Finnish parliaments. We are very encouraged by this and feel that we must seize the opportunity to examine a wide range of proposals on their merits and without preconceived prejudices'.
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Another member of the Convention, Dutch MP René van der Linden, admitted that he had not yet made up his mind: 'Frankly-I'm not sure what my stance will be'. He wanted to wait for the results of the working group. 53 The debate was thus a real one in that it was not clear from the beginning what the best solution would be for giving national parliaments a greater role.
President Giscard d'Estaing was disappointed by the debate on national parliaments. Didn't public opinion expect more than just improving the system? Shouldn't there be a more dramatic approach? The working group, to his mind, should take a 'bolder approach with a higher democratic profile'.
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Parliamentarian representatives clearly participated most actively. 60 of 70 contributions, 86% of the total, were made by parliamentarians. This does, of course, reflect the overall composition of the Convention (69% of members coming from parliaments) and the subject of the debate on 7 th June 2000. The structure of participation in the debate shows a hierarchy: The United Kingdom took first place with 5 contributions, followed by Finland and Italy with 4 and Austria and Denmark with 3. Then there was a broad 'middle-field' with countries that made two contributions. Among the 8 countries that intervened only once, 5 were accession states. 55 Finally, there were three countries that did not intervene at all: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Estonia. Evaluation of the debate on national parliaments shows that it was communicative. Nearly half of all participants referred to one another in their contributions-either by naming a fellow member or through statements such as 'as many members have said', or really taking up the argument of another member. And of 30 'conventionnels' who referred to others, half took up the argument of another member at length.
The working group on national parliaments was headed by Gisela Stuart from the British Parliament. The group held its first meeting soon after the plenary debate at the end of June. Members of the working group described the experience of their national parliaments with participation in European decision making. Swedish MP Sören Lekberg, for example, pleaded for a strong role for national parliaments in European matters, and explained the Swedish example (Working Group IV, Working document 18 of 3 rd September 2002). In this paper Lekberg made reference to the plenary debate and to the arguments of Convention members who believed an active role for national parliaments at the European level would be jeopardize the effectiveness of the Council.
Finally, the working group tabled two recommendations. First, there should be a mechanism giving national parliaments the opportunity to monitor the principal of subsidiarity at an early stage in the legislative process. 'Most members' of the working group were in favour of this recommendation. Second, members agreed that COSAC, as a conference of parliamentarian committees on European affairs, should be strengthened. Interparliamentary conferences between committees of the European Parliament and of national parliaments on a broad range of subjects should be made possible (CONV 353/02).
In the final plenary debate on national parliaments, too, parliamentary representatives were the most active participants, although less so than in the debate on June 2002: 68% of all contributions came from parliamentarians. Once again, women were overrepresented and accession state members underrepresented in participation in proportion to the composition of the Convention (Table 4) . Of the eight countries whose governmental or parliamentary representatives intervened only once in the debate, six were accession states. Of the five countries whose governmental or parliamentary representatives did not participate at all three were accession states. Once again, the United Kingdom was most active with four contributions. In the plenary debate on 5 th June 2003, members of the Convention referred to contributions of their colleagues 38 times in a total of 71 interventions. They used blue cards six times for spontaneous intervention. More than half the members taking an active part in the debate referred to other members by name, to 'many members of the Convention' or discussed the argument of a fellow member in detail. The fact that critical comments were made on the procedure for involving national parliaments at the European level until the very last moment also demonstrates the communicative structure of the debate. The Portuguese deputy Maria Eduarda Azevedo stressed that national parliaments had to be effectively involved in the European arena. She pointed to the opportunity to involve national parliaments in shaping the European Union-now. This chance should be taken honestly-there should be no playing to the gallery. In her view, the interparliamentary conferences should exchange opinions on important subjects like the common foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs. She felt that these conferences should not only be mentioned in a protocol, but in the first part of the Constitutional Treaty. 57 The British MP David Heathcoat-Amory criticized the solution preferred by the majority of the Convention: 'Mr. President, a couple of quick points. First, regarding subsidiarity, everyone agrees with subsidiarity but there is an inconsistency. Article I -9 says that national parliaments shall ensure compliance with the subsidiarity principle, which implies a power; but the protocol only grants national parliaments a request. The matter has to be reviewed, but then the Commission can proceed anyway. So I urge that we bring the various parts of this Constitution into line with each other to ensure consistency. If there is an implied power it has got to be backed up with an actual power'. In other areas, members of the Convention were less successful in convincing the Presidency and the Praesidium. The hierarchy in the Convention and difference in interests between big and small countries played a role in the decision-making process concerning the President of the European Council. Let us turn therefore to this example and the way difference in interests was dealt with in the Convention. 
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C. Difference in Interests in the Convention
There has been a great deal of structural difference in interests in the Convention in institutional matters like the composition of the Commission, qualified majority, and a permanent President of the European Council (Title IV of Part I of the draft). The decisive debate took place on 15 th May 2003. Members of the Convention referred to the contributions of fellow members 39 times, and used blue cards 11 times during the morning session from 9.45 to 12.40. 650 amendments were tabled. At the beginning of the debate there was a discussion on procedures inside the Convention. 40 members of the Convention had signed a motion requesting additional meetings because there would not be enough time for adequate discussion of policies. David Heathcoat-Amory from the British Parliament wanted to make sure that the arguments of members of the Convention were taken into account by the Praesidium: 'Mr. President, when the revised text of Part I is available, I ask that the changes that have been made to it be made clear. There should also be an explanation of the origin of the amendments that have been accepted and the degree of support that they attracted, in order that we can be sure that the changes to the text arise from our discussions and do not come down from above like the tablets from Mount Sinai'.
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Not only members in plenary but also members in the Praesidium could remember a text coming 'down from above like the tablets from Mount Sinai'. On 22 nd April 2003, President Giscard d'Estaing presented a first draft on 'The Union's Institutions' to the press that had not been previously discussed. The draft proposed that 'the European Council shall elect a President by qualified majority for a term of two and a half years, renewable once'. The President 'shall be assisted by a Vice-President, elected for the same term and by the same procedure'.
61 Such a post of Vice-President had been discussed neither in plenary session nor in the Praesidium. If Mr. Papandreou's proposal was accepted and we allowed the people to elect the President of Europe, then we would create a European demos. Many people say that we cannot have such a thing until we have a European demos. We will never have a European demos until we have a European election because a European election to select a president will create such a demos. It will create such a political space, it will create such a European debate. We will never have it with the present system, and that is why I support what George Papandreou has proposed. (Table 6 ). The communicative structure is similar to the debates summarised above: the debate has a high 'discursive level'. 65 Quite often when referring to one another, members of the Convention mentioned fellow members by name. Sometimes 'conventionnels' spoke of 'those who support the proposal' or stated 'I understand the comments made by the various members of the Convention', and so on. In nearly half the interventions in which 'conventionnels' referred to one another, they discussed the argument of one or more fellow members in depth.
In this case the dominance of parliamentary representatives in the debate and the communicative structure of the discussion did not influence the output of the decision-making process to a large extent. Though a majority of Convention members were against a permanent President of the European Council, in the end the Convention decided to propose such a permanent position in the draft text of the Constitutional Treaty.
Whether a general shift from arguing to bargaining occurred towards the end of the Convention's work still needs to be examined. 66 The influence of the Praesidium and the governments of big member states in the question of the Presidency of the European Council was due to time pressure towards the Thus, the plenary debate on the President of the European Council was not without influence on the final outcome of the Convention's work. In the end, the governments of the big member states France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Germany were influential enough to direct the decision-making of the Convention towards accepting a President of the European Council elected for a term of two and a half years (Article I -21 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe). 77 On the question of a permanent President of the Council the Praesidium of the Convention and the big member states had their way.
But even in this case, argument demonstrably played a role until the very end of the Convention's work. And it was no minor change included by the Praesidium because of criticism from Convention members. Moreover, public debate in plenary session made the decision-making process more transparent. It became clear that the decision to have a permanent President of the European Council was taken against the manifest views of a large number of Convention members. And the transparency of the Convention's work proved to be favourable for the media-coverage of European constitution making. The Convention being a 'strong public', in which opinion formation and decision-making took place, was able to foster general publics like the media. 78 If average media coverage per month from the beginning of the Convention until July 2003 is taken into account, it is not surprising that the media paid so little attention. 79 But coverage of the Convention was extensive whenever events occurred that were apt to attract media interest. 
D. Explanatory Capacity of Politics of Difference for the Results of the Convention's Work
In this paragraph I look at the dependent variable, the output of the Convention's work. Did the decision-making process inside the Convention with regard to politics of difference influence the results of the Convention's work? Is there a correlation between dealing with differences in a democratic and communicative way and a draft Constitutional Treaty that can qualify as a basis for political decisions that possess governing-and problem-solving capacity? Implementation of the Constitutional Treaty for the European Union cannot yet be assessed. Nobody can know what will happen once this Treaty is put into practice. But we can examine whether the text has the capacity to provide a future basis for perceiving societal problems, for deciding in time on 75 European policies, whether it has the capacity to develop adequate policies, to promote successful implementation of these policies 81 and whether it is a comprehensible, acceptable, and convincing document for citizens of the European Union. And besides analysing the capacity of the Constitutional Treaty for promoting successful governance one will have to look in a long-term perspective if this Constitutional Treaty might contribute to polity legitimation of the European Union. 'By polity legitimation is meant the very acceptance of the entity in question as a legitimate political community '. 82 In the context of this article I examine the governing-and problem-solving capacity of the Constitutional Treaty with regard to the influence of national parliaments and a permanent President of the European Council. The question is whether the Convention draft offers an adequate response to the task of European constitutionalism in the protocol on national parliaments and the European Council. The European Union as a supranational political system 'decouples citizenship and nationhood and conceives the constitution as a system for accommodating difference […] The legislative structure of the modern constitutional state, and the modern idea of democratic citizenship makes solidarity between strangers possible'.
83 I want to take this idea of Erik Oddvar Eriksen a little farther. My analytical approach regards a European Constitutional Treaty not only as a system for accommodating difference 84 but also as a system for the democratic organisation of difference. If difference is accommodated, all the better. If not, it is no tragedy as long as there are democratic procedures for dealing with differences. A Constitutional Treaty capable of organising difference democratically must have structures that are democratic and participatory, and which both respect and organise difference.
Does the draft Treaty offer democratic, participatory, difference-respecting and differenceorganising structures with regard to national parliaments and the President of the European Council? Debate on the influence of national parliaments on European politics in the draft Constitutional Treaty engendered a procedure for the participation of national parliaments in applying the principle of subsidiarity. An 'early-warning' system is to inform national parliaments about all Commission legislative proposals at the same time as the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Within six weeks of notification of the Commission's proposal, any national parliament may send a 'reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the proposal in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity'( § 5 of the protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality). In cases where reasoned opinions from national parliaments represent at least one third 'of all the votes allocated to the Member States's Parliaments and their chambers' ( § 6), the Commission has to review its proposal. After review, however, the Commission is free to maintain, amend or withdraw the proposal. At the end of the procedure, the European Court of Justice might intervene. On behalf of their national parliament each member state can take action before the European Court of Justice on grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a legislative act.
From the problem-solving point of view, the 'early-warning-system' for national parliaments in controlling subsidiarity has two shortcomings. National parliaments do not have real participatory power: they can only initiate the review of a proposal by the Commission. And final resort on questions of subsidiarity to the European Court of Justice could intensify the judicialization of 
politics
. 85 Yet, compared with the status quo, where national parliaments have little say in European politics and where governments are gaining more and more power, the solution offered by the Convention's draft is an important step forward towards a more democratic European Union. 86 And as the problem-solving capacity of European decisions grows with the greater democratic accountability of these decisions, the protocol on the role of national parliaments could be a contribution to the problem-solving capacity of the European Union.
The protocol on the role of national parliaments includes another element that could lend greater problem-solving capacity. There is a paragraph on interparliamentary conferences that goes back to proposals made by members of the Convention in plenary debate. COSAC 'shall […] promote the exchange of information and best practice between Member State's Parliaments and the European Parliament, including their special committees. The Conference may also organise interparliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of common foreign and security policy and of common security and defence policy. The protocol on the role of national parliaments is an example for the positive potential of differences in the Convention. For the participation of national parliaments at the European level it can be shown that differences in parliamentary experience and institutional concepts were advantages for the Convention output. Members of the Convention managed to use this potential. They exchanged their experience of parliamentary influence on European politics. Sweden was referred to by many members of the Convention as an example of a country where the parliament can influence politics at the European level. Different ways of ensuring more influence for national parliaments at the European level were debated. Though not many members of the Convention were in favour of a new institution, this idea was discussed, as well. President Giscard d'Estaing was unable to use his status to impose his idea of a Congress of the People. In sum, arguments were an important resource in the debate, and the procedure for participation by national parliaments that emerged from this debate can strengthen European democracy. What Thucydides had considered so long ago to be necessary for effective decision-making still proved valid:
Instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all. Again, in our enterprises we present the singular spectacle of daring and deliberation, each carried to its highest point, and both united in the same persons; although usually decision is the fruit of ignorance, hesitation of reflection. (Thucydides II, 40) . 87 To what extent the positive potential of difference could develop in other areas, too, can be judged only after close analysis of debates and documents for specific parts of the draft.
What about the Convention's draft provisions on the President of the European Council? In my view, the solution can indeed offer a basis for legitimate and effective decisions by the European Council. Although difference was dealt with less democratically and communicatively in the decisionmaking process than was in deciding about the role of national parliaments, it cannot be said that democratic and communicative processes were of no relevance whatsoever. It has been shown that the review of the first draft provisions on the President of the European Council was provoked by the 
